TacticUA · independent

Shahed Seeker locks targets beyond EW jamming range; Russia fits CRPA GPS shields

Published 22 July 2026

A Ukrainian drone-operator channel reports that the ‘Shahed Seeker’ variant acquires and locks onto targets using a high-resolution camera at standoff distances where ground-based EW systems cannot yet reach the drone — the operator visually confirms the target (including any bystanders) before closing, rendering proximity-based jamming on protected vehicles largely ineffective. The same source reports Russia is now countering Ukrainian GPS spoofing of Shahed navigators by fitting receivers with CRPA (Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna) arrays, which adaptively null jamming signals by direction of arrival. Both escalations reflect the same dynamic: each countermeasure forces the adversary’s response to extend further in range or antenna sophistication.

Sources — 1 post

Victory Drones friendly22 Jul 2026 Open the post

Topicselectronic warfare drones

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