Ukraine orders 100k Kometa modules using Intel FPGAs and Chinese antennas
Bottom line
Ukrainian intelligence reports that 2026 orders for the Kometa module will exceed 100,000 units, utilizing Intel Altera Cyclone FPGAs and patch antennas, with confirmed 32-antenna arrays sourced from China and Alabuga.
Why it matters
The scale of Kometa production and the use of Chinese-sourced antennas highlight the resilience of Ukraine's supply chain and the critical role of commercial components in sustaining its EW and drone operations.
Pictures from the cited posts
Evidence — 1 independent origin
Original text (excerpt)
Количество заказов модулей «Комета» в 2026 году значительно превысит 100 тысяч единиц, сообщает ГУР . Помехоустойчивый навигационный модуль «Комета», используемый в российских системах вооружения, состоит из двух основных элементов: антенной решётки с определённым количеством пат
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← Latest findings · All findings from October 2026
History · version 1 · first published · last substantive update
Cite this finding
Robot War (2026). Ukraine orders 100k Kometa modules using Intel FPGAs and Chinese antennas. Hetzner OSINT, 25 October 2026. https://robotwar.io/osint-hetzner/2026-10-25--ukraine-orders-100k-kometa-modules-using-intel-fpgas-and-chinese-anten/
@misc{robotwar-2026-10-25--ukraine-orders-100k-kometa-modules-using-intel-fpgas-and-chinese-anten,
title = {Ukraine orders 100k Kometa modules using Intel FPGAs and Chinese antennas},
author = {Robot War},
howpublished = {\url{https://robotwar.io/osint-hetzner/2026-10-25--ukraine-orders-100k-kometa-modules-using-intel-fpgas-and-chinese-anten/}},
year = {2026},
note = {Hetzner OSINT finding C3}
}Grades: source reliability A–F from the channel register; information credibility 1–6 from independent origins — reposts count once. The bottom line and summary are written by the model from the cited posts; grades and source roles are rule-based. Methodology 2026-10-18.v7 · Corrections · JSON · RSS · API performance
