Russian targeting cameras: what the operator sees

The cameras found in Russian attack drones, the links that could carry their picture to an operator, and what that picture looks like by the time it arrives: how sharp, how smooth and how late.

Updated

On every remote link compared here the operator's picture is 256–267 ms old. At 600 km/h that is 43–45 m of flight the screen has not shown yet. What separates the links is how much picture gets through.

In autumn 2026 Russian jet drones began hitting small, exact targets in Kyiv. Ukrainian specialists describe operators watching a live picture and steering in the final phase, over a relay of some kind. This page asks what such a picture can actually be. It starts from the cameras found in wreckage, adds the published capacity and delay of each kind of link, and works out what an operator far away would receive.

The numbers come from datasheets, standards, measurement studies and HUR’s component records, each linked. Where a value is our own arithmetic, the page says so. The simulator below draws a stylised scene, not real imagery, because the approach geometry of these strikes has not been published.

The operator's screen

A simulation built from published parameters. The left screen is what the drone's camera records; each screen beside it is what an operator would receive over one link chain: the picture its bitrate allows, at its frame rate, as late as its delay makes it. The city is drawn, not real, and the flight path is a stated profile, because no source has published the approach of any of these strikes.

The cameras

What has been found or reported on each platform, at the camera's own published maximum. The picture an operator receives is smaller: see the links below.

PlatformCameraNative pictureField of viewOutputEvidence
Geran-5Geran-5Geran-5 strike camera (claimed, not found in wreckage)nose
Note
HUR’s Geran-5 component list (January 2026) has no camera. The claim that Geran-5s film their own hits comes from a Russian post, relayed on 30 September 2026 by the Victory Drones channel in its “enemy intelligence” section (the parts notebook calls the source Ukrainian; the quoted text is Russian and speaks of “our drone operators”). The widely shared Russian video of the Geran-5 hitting the Inkom business centre in Kyiv (25 September 2026) was, according to Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, filmed by a separate jet “Shahed” circling at almost 3 km that also relayed the Geran-5’s radio link. That footage is filed under geran-seeker-forward-camera. The Geran-5 K5’s optical navigation unit is a separate row (susanin-optical-correlation).
not publishednot publishedClaimed source 1, source 2, source 3
Geran-4, Geran-5 K5Geran-4 (October 2026 version); Geran-5 K5"Susanin" (Сусанин) optical-electronic correlation unitseeker
Note
A navigation camera, not a targeting one. HUR lists the unit in the October 2026 Geran-4 and describes it as comparing the optical sensor’s image with a reference image stored in the computer, to keep the drone on its route. Colonel GSh reported the same class of module (OEKS/DSMAC, as on the Kh-101) on a modified Geran-5 K5 on 27 September 2026. Confirmed for the Geran-4; official-claim for the Geran-5 K5 (HUR says a similar system is used there). No camera model, resolution or field of view has been published.
not publishednot publishednight: Not published. A Russian outlet says it works less well at night or in thick fog; HUR gives no figure.Confirmed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4, source 5
Geran-2, Geran-4Geran-2 'Э' series with Verba MANPADS; Geran-4; Shahed downed at Zatoka, December 2025Honpho TS130C-01 two-axis gimbal camera (EO + LWIR + laser rangefinder)gimbalHonpho (Chengdu, China)EO 0.4–0.9 µm, sensor type not published; LWIR uncooled 8–14 µm, 12 µm pixel
Note
HUR lists the TS130C-01 as the optical camera of the Geran-2 “Э” with a Verba MANPADS (published 12 January 2026) and as a camera in the Geran-4 (12 August 2026). Beskrestnov identified the same Honpho product page from a camera in a Shahed downed at Zatoka the day before his post of 20 December 2025, describing it as an optical camera plus a thermal imager and laser rangefinder. Honpho’s datasheet also lists a 1535 nm rangefinder (50 m to 3–4 km), video over Ethernet, control over RS422, a tracking function (minimum target 4 × 3 pixels), ≤1.26 kg and ≤15 W average. It does not publish a frame rate or codec. Our observation (inference): the EO figures (4.3–129 mm, 30x, 63.7°–2.3°, 1080p) are identical to Sony’s FCB-EV7520 camera block; which block Honpho uses is not published.
1920×1080640×51263.7°EO 63.7° (wide) to 2.3° (tele), 4.3–129 mm, 30x optical; LWIR 12.5° × 10° (35/50 mm, F1.0)ipnight: Uncooled LWIR thermal channel, 640 × 512Confirmed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4
Geran-4Geran-4Geran-4 bay camera with cover marked "Мини-бутерброд" (Mini-sandwich)belly
Note
Radio Svoboda’s Schemes filmed a Geran-4 with a specialist who studies Shahed wreckage (19 September 2026). The camera has day, night and infrared channels, 10x optical zoom and a digital zoom given as “32”. Newer airframes have a place designed in for the camera; earlier ones had cameras bolted on. The role “belly” reflects “bay”; Schemes does not say which way it looks. Alabuga’s internal code names are kitchen words: Beskrestnov wrote that “Хлеб” (bread) is probably the camera and later that “Бутерброд” (sandwich) is the Shahed’s camera. The 10x zoom does not match Honpho’s 30x TS130C-01, so this is kept as a separate camera until a marking links them.
not publishednot publishednight: Day, night and infrared channels (as described to Radio Svoboda's Schemes)Claimed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4
Geran-4, Geran-2, Geran-3Geran-4 Seeker (jet); Seeker kit on Geran-2 and Geran-3 (per Beskrestnov)Geran "Seeker" (Сикер) forward zoom/thermal camera, model not identifiednose
Note
Beskrestnov (30 June 2026): the Seeker option fits Geran-2 to Geran-4, carries several cameras working in different modes, is flown over a mesh modem, and uses a Raspberry Pi for recognition, lock-on and homing. On 27 July he described two cameras connected through a network switch to the mesh modem: one looks back at pursuing interceptors, the other has a zoom and is used to search for and lock the target. He said in August that capture range on good cameras can reach many kilometres in clear weather. Militarnyi (2 August 2026) described a redesigned nose with a compact electro-optical sensor for terminal guidance. Output “ip” is inferred from the switch-to-mesh-modem description. The Russian footage below shows a crosshair and a lock box, colour by day and monochrome (thermal) at other times. That the view is the strike drone’s own camera is the publishing channels’ claim. Exception: the Inkom footage, which Beskrestnov attributes to an accompanying jet Shahed at almost 3 km.
not publishednot publishedipnight: Thermal mode shown in Russian footage; Beskrestnov published a diesel locomotive filmed on thermal by a Shahed operator from 5–6 kmClaimed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4, source 5, source 6, source 7, source 8
Geran-4Geran-4 SeekerDahua TiOC dual-lens 180° panoramic camera (exact model not identified)noseZhejiang Dahua Technology (China)
Note
Militarnyi (2 August 2026): a fixed, forward-facing auxiliary camera on the Geran-4 Seeker was identified by OSINT researchers (an X post by HEMemarian) as a Dahua TiOC dual-lens panoramic camera with a 180° view, from wreckage photos published by Beskrestnov. It is believed to give wide-area terrain observation, or to watch for interceptors in the final phase. HUR has not listed it. The 180° comes from the report; the other fields stay null because the model is not named. As a reference only: Dahua’s TiOC 2x4 MP 180° bullet IPC-PFW3849S-A180-AS-PV lists dual 1/2.7" CMOS, 4096 × 1860 at up to 20 fps, 180° × 86°, H.265/H.264 and RJ-45 Ethernet. “output: ip” assumes the TiOC range is network-only, as Dahua’s pages for it show.
not published180°ipClaimed source 1, source 2
Geran-2Geran-2 'Э' series with R-60 missileHikvision DS-2CD1343G2-LIUF (probable) 4 MP network turretnoseHangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology (China)1/3" progressive scan CMOS
Note
HUR’s camera record for the R-60 Geran says only “Probably Hikvision DS-2CD1343G2-LIUF”. Militarnyi reports two cameras on this airframe, in the nose and behind the launcher, with video and control carried over a Xingkay Tech XK-F358 mesh modem. Which of the two cameras HUR’s record is, is not stated; “nose” is our assumption from the nose camera being named first. Frame rates are at 50 Hz (24 fps at 60 Hz). The datasheet figures are from a retailer listing (Panacompu) of the LIUF/SL variant: 1080p/720p, RJ45 Ethernet, max 8 W, 340 g. The Videor sheet is for the LIU sibling: 0.005 lux, 120 dB WDR, 30 fps maximum. Hikvision’s own product page did not load for us.
2560×1440 at 20 fps1920×1080@25; 1280×720@2598°98° with the 2.8 mm lens, 78° with the 4 mm lens; which lens was fitted is not publishediph264, h265night: IR illumination with an IR-cut filter, plus white light (Smart Hybrid Light); figures from a distributor sheet for the LIU siblingOfficial claim source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4
Geran-2Geran-2 'Э' series with R-60 missileSecond camera behind the R-60 launcher (unidentified)gimbal
Note
Militarnyi, on HUR’s data: two cameras, one in the nose and one behind the launcher on the upper front fuselage. Militarnyi suggests the images go to an operator who orders the launch if a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter appears. HUR’s page for this airframe lists “Camera” twice, but both link to the same record (part/5057). The role field is a placeholder; Militarnyi gives the position, not the mount.
not publishednot publishedClaimed source 1, source 2
Geran-2Shahed-136 (Geran-2) MS001Analog infrared video camera SH.2.125.019 with EZCAP USB 3.0 AHD capture (Shahed-136 / Geran-2 MS001)seekerCamera maker not identified; capture unit Shenzhen ForwardVideo Technology (EZCAP), China
Note
HUR’s June 2025 record for the MS001 airframe, downed over Sumy Oblast. The analog infrared camera contains three boards. HUR lists a TI TMS320C6455 DSP, Micron memory, an Analog Devices SD/HD video encoder (2009), an RS-485/422 transceiver and a PLD. The EZCAP USB 3.0 unit turns the analog (AHD) feed into USB video for an NVIDIA Jetson Orin Nano Developer Kit. HUR said the Jetson compares camera images with loaded models to choose targets (ArmyInform). The role “seeker” follows that description, not a mount position. “output: analog” is the camera side; the capture unit’s output to the Jetson is USB.
not publishednot publishedanalognight: Infrared (HUR's name for the camera); band and resolution not publishedConfirmed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4, source 5
Geran-2Geran-2 (serial fit from about September 2025)Fixed forward "course" camera in the Geran-2 nose (unidentified, 2025)nose
Note
Defense Express (11 September 2025), from its own sources on a recently downed Shahed: a rigidly mounted nose camera looking only forward, resembling a simple security camera. It is good enough for flight monitoring and possibly last-minute target correction. Ukrainian specialists said such cameras were being fitted systematically. An earlier, improvised fit was reported in March 2024: a video camera with a 4G/Wi-Fi modem on a downed Shahed-136, which Defense Express called the first documented case.
not publishednot publishedClaimed source 1, source 2
Geran-3Geran-3 recovered intact 16 September 2025Geran-3 video camera with live feed (unidentified; kit matches Geran-2 'Ъ' series)nose
Note
Militarnyi reported an intact Geran-3 with a video camera, a live-feed system and a mesh modem; the video kit is the same as on the Geran-2 “Ъ” series. A video shared by the Ukrainian Facebook group Zampotekh Omelianovych showed the camera and modem still working after recovery. The placement is not published; “nose” is a placeholder.
not publishednot publishedClaimed source 1, source 2, source 3
GerberaGerberaTopotek KHY10S90 three-axis gimbal cameragimbalTopotek (China)2 MP CMOS (type not published)
Note
HUR lists it as a camera with a three-axis gimbal in the Gerbera (published 18 November 2024). HUR’s article of the same day says the drone carries it, with a Xingkai Tech modem, for pilot guidance and aerial reconnaissance. The specs and price are from a reseller listing (rcdrone.top), not a Topotek datasheet. It gives an RTSP 1080p network stream plus HDMI, H.264/H.265 recording to microSD, about 396 g, and USD 559 (sold out). Output “ip” is the network stream; HDMI is also listed.
1920×108061.5°61.5° (wide) to 7.0° (tele), f = 5.15–47.38 mm, 10x optical + 9x digitaliph264, h265night: IR-cut filter (day/night switching); no thermal channelConfirmed source 1, source 2, source 3
GerberaGerbera downed August 2025Viewpro A40-series gimbal camera (variant not stated)gimbalViewpro (China)
Note
Beskrestnov found a video from a Chinese factory test on the camera of a downed Gerbera (30 August 2025). Militarnyi identified the camera from his photo as a Viewpro A40. Cyber Boroshno geolocated the test footage to the Aotexing Science Park in Shenzhen. Kyiv Post cites Viewpro’s site at USD 2,999 before discounts. HUR had not listed it. Numbers stay null because the A40 variant (A40, A40 Pro, A40T, …) is not stated. As a reference only, A40 Pro reseller listings give a 1/2.8" Sony CMOS at 1080p, 40x optical (4.25–170 mm), 73.8°–2.16°.
not publishednot publishedClaimed source 1, source 2, source 3
GerberaGerbera / Gerbera-2 with camera and mesh modem (2026)Gerbera upper (top-mounted) camera (unidentified)gimbal
Note
Beskrestnov (6–7 July 2026): Gerberas with cameras and mesh modems, including “upper cameras”, were flying in numbers along the border and letting themselves be shot down. He read this as studying Ukrainian interceptor tactics, and possibly collecting AI training data. A Gerbera-2 that crashed in Moldova in September 2026 also carried a camera (Military Informant, via Victory Drones). The mount type is not published; “gimbal” is a placeholder.
not publishednot publishedClaimed source 1, source 2, source 3
Molniya-2Molniya-2R (reconnaissance version)SIYI ZR10 2K three-axis gimbal cameragimbalSIYI Technology (Shenzhen, China)1/2.7" 4 MP CMOS
Note
HUR lists the ZR10 in the Molniya-2R reconnaissance version (22 December 2025), next to an unidentified forward video camera. Ukrinform reports that a Starlink terminal carries video from both cameras. SIYI’s own page gives the 1/2.7" 4 MP CMOS, 2K, 10x optical / 30x hybrid zoom and AI recognition and tracking. A reseller (rcdrone.top) gives 2560 × 1440 at 30 fps recording to microSD in H.265, 71.5° horizontal, Ethernet video output, 5 W, 381 g and USD 589. The 30 fps and the H.265 apply to the card recording; the stream format over Ethernet is not stated there.
2560×1440 at 30 fps71.5°71.5° horizontal / 79.5° diagonal at the wide end; 10x optical, 30x hybrid zoomiph265night: Starlight low-light sensor (SIYI); no thermal channelConfirmed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4
Molniya-2Molniya-1; Molniya-2; Molniya-2RMolniya forward FPV camera (Caddx on Molniya-1; unidentified on Molniya-2R)noseCaddx (China) on the Molniya-1; not identified on the Molniya-2R
Note
HUR lists a Caddx video camera in the Molniya-1 (10 December 2024) and an unidentified “video camera” in the Molniya-2R (22 December 2025); neither record names a model. The airframe carries the camera in the nose (Forces News). Beskrestnov reported in July and September 2026 that some Molniyas carry a mechanical compass that the camera periodically tilts down to read. In July 2026 he reported Molniyas with no control antenna, only a camera and a computer. In February 2026 Hvylya reported an unfamiliar computer between camera and mesh modem, which it identified as a SIYI AI Tracking Module II. Only the Caddx find is confirmed.
not publishednot publishednight: Beskrestnov warned in April 2025 that the Molniya flies at night with a thermal imager (model not named)Confirmed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4, source 5, source 6, source 7, source 8
Lancet, ZALA Lancet-3Lancet (Izdeliye-51); Lancet-3Lancet (Izdeliye-51) camera with GK-BX4M camera board and video processing unitnoseZALA Aero says it makes the camera (per ISIS); WONWOO Engineering (South Korea) video processor
Note
HUR’s March 2026 Lancet record lists a camera, a GK-BX4M camera board, a video processing unit with a WONWOO Engineering video processor, a video signal transmission unit and an optical rangefinder, alongside an NVIDIA Jetson TX2. It does not describe what each does. ISIS: a camera at the front is used to identify targets visually and to guide the attack, and ZALA claims to make it. Militarnyi (July 2023): the optical sensor was replaced with a better one after Syria and early Ukraine use, and the last metres are often flown “blind” on the optical sensor when the link drops. In the older Lancet-3, HUR’s record also has an Analog Devices ADV7180 video decoder and an ADV7391 SD/HD video encoder (composite, S-video or component analog). That suggests an analog video stage (inference).
not publishednot publishedConfirmed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4, source 5, source 6, source 7, source 8
LancetLancetSkoopia 20Z10S-NF digital camera (Lancet optoelectronic system)noseSkoopia (Netherlands, per HUR)
Note
HUR files the camera under the Lancet’s “Optoelectronic system” (record published 1 June 2024, the date HUR’s database went public). We found no datasheet for this marking, so no numbers are given. The placement follows ISIS’s description of the front camera and is not stated by HUR.
not publishednot publishedConfirmed source 1
LancetLancet (later production)Lancet lidar fuze with two optical camerasnose
Note
Militarnyi (9 November 2023): a lidar that uses two optical cameras to measure the distance to the target, so the charge goes off a few metres short. The change defeated net protection. Not a viewing camera; listed so the page does not count it as one.
not publishednot publishedClaimed source 1
V2UV2USony IMX477 12.3 MP image sensor in a gimbal camera module (V2U)gimbalSony Semiconductor Solutions (Japan); module maker not identifiedSony IMX477, 7.857 mm diagonal (Type 1/2.3), 12.3 MP back-illuminated CMOS
Note
HUR’s V2U record (9 June 2025) lists a “camera module” containing the IMX477 sensor and a GM3506 gimbal motor, beside an NVIDIA Jetson Orin on a Leetop carrier board. HUR says the V2U can detect and recognise objects and lock onto a target automatically. Sensor figures are Sony’s datasheet, via a mirrored copy: 60 fps at full resolution with 10-bit ADC, 40 fps with 12-bit, over MIPI CSI-2. What the module actually streams, and through which lens, is not published.
4056×3040 at 60 fps4056×3040@40not publishedDepends on the lens, which HUR does not namemipinight: None published (visible-light sensor)Confirmed source 1, source 2, source 3
Orlan-10Orlan-10 (May and June 2022 examples)Sony FCB-EV7520 30x HD block camera on the GOES-V stabilised mount (Orlan-10)gimbalSony (Japan)1/2.8-type Exmor R CMOS, about 2.13 MP effective
Note
HUR lists an FCB-EV7520 in an Orlan-10 recovered in June 2022, and a Sony FCB-series camera (model not given) in the GOES-V stabilising system of Orlan-10 No. 11333 (May 2022). The same Orlan records include an Axis M7011 single-channel video encoder and TI 5150 video decoders (Axis is a network video encoder, so the stream is probably IP; inference). Specs are from Sony’s own manual: HD digital out over LVDS and SD analog (VBS) out, VISCA control, -5 to +60 °C. 720p modes are listed at 59.94/50/29.97/25. “output: lvds” is not one of the schema’s values; the analog SD output is “analog”.
1920×1080 at 60 fps1920×1080@50; 1920×1080@30; 1920×1080@25; 1280×720@6063.7°About 63.7° (wide) to about 2.3° (tele); f = 4.3–129 mm, F1.6–F4.7, 30x optical, 12x digitallvdsnight: No thermal; 0.01 lx typical in high-sensitivity mode (1/30 s, 50%), ICR (IR-cut) switchingConfirmed source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4
Orlan-10Orlan-10 opened by Ukraine's MoD, April 2022Canon EOS 750D (Rebel T6i) consumer DSLR (Orlan-10)Canon (Japan)APS-C CMOS, about 24.2 MP effective
Note
A Ukrainian MoD teardown video (April 2022) showed the camera fixed to a board with a hook-and-loop strip and its mode dial glued, among other cameras that were not identified. The still resolution in pixels is not quoted by the cited sources and is left null. The 1080p 24/25/30 modes are from MPB’s spec page. Which way it points, the lens fitted and how its images are used are not published.
not published at 30 fps1920×1080@30; 1920×1080@25; 1920×1080@24not publishednight: noneConfirmed source 1, source 2
Russian FPV strike drones flown at nightRunCam Night Eagle 3 analog night FPV camera (Russian night FPV, per Beskrestnov)noseRunCam (Shenzhen, China)1/2.8" 2 MP
Note
Beskrestnov (16 November 2023): Russian night FPV attacks use either the cheap analog RunCam Night Eagle 3 (about USD 50, his figure) or digital night cameras at USD 250–400. RunCam’s page (Night Eagle 3 V2, now discontinued) gives 1500 TVL, NTSC/PAL switchable, 5–24 V and 8.5 g. Analog output has no pixel resolution, so resolution and fps stay null.
not published107°107° (125° diagonal) or 75° (97° diagonal), depending on the lens optionanalognight: Starlight low-light sensor, black-and-white image; Beskrestnov says the cheap analog cameras need twilight or a bright moon, not full darknessClaimed source 1, source 2
Russian fibre-optic FPV dronesThermal camera on Russian fibre-optic FPV drones (model not identified)nose
Note
Beskrestnov (15 October 2025): one series of fibre-optic drones carries a fairly good thermal camera, a 5 V unit with an analog video wire. He did not name the model. In October 2024 he wrote that a fibre-optic drone costs about as much as a drone with a thermal camera. Both posts are about cost and recovery, not performance.
not publishednot publishedanalognight: ThermalClaimed source 1, source 2

No camera model published for: KUB-BLA, Scalpel, S-71M Monokhrom, Geran-5.

  • KUB-BLA: No camera part or model has been published. ZALA marketed AI target recognition; a CSIS review in May 2022 found the claim weakly supported. [1]
  • Scalpel: HUR’s March 2026 record lists an Orange Pi computer and an STM32H743 but no camera. HUR and ArmyInform say it is operator-guided in real time and do not describe the video chain. [1] [2]
  • S-71M Monokhrom: HUR confirms an NVIDIA Jetson Orin module (TE980M-A1) but lists no camera. That it works with a camera for terminal guidance is the claim of the Colonel GSh channel, relayed by UNITED24 Media. [1] [2]
  • Geran-5: See geran-5-onboard-camera-claimed. No camera in HUR’s list; the Inkom footage is attributed to a companion drone. [1] [2]

The strikes

Precision attacks cited as evidence that a drone was steered in its last seconds. What is known about each: when, where, which drone and how sure that is, the footage, and the link chains the evidence fits. No source has published the approach geometry of any of them.

  • Jet drone into the SBU headquarters, Volodymyrska Street

    strike Confirmed
    Date
    2026-09-04
    Place
    Kyiv, Shevchenkivskyi district, 33 Volodymyrska Street (opposite St Sophia Cathedral)
    Target
    Central building of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU); the SBU and President Zelensky said the drone was aimed at the office of acting SBU head Oleksandr Poklad, who was not there
    Drone
    Geran-4 (confirmed)
    Approach
    unpublished
    The evidence in full
    The strike happened in daylight during an air-raid alert, about 16:00 local time according to a Russian war correspondent’s post (sashakots/64214); the first clip was reposted at 13:33 UTC (16:33 local). The approach before the final dive is the best documented of any case here, though only as cruise data. Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov wrote that all Ukrainian systems tracked the jet drone from the Donetsk direction to Kyiv at more than 7 km altitude, and that two jet drones flew in as a pair, only one arriving. Wreckage was examined and most parts identified as a Geran-4 (serhii_flash/7734, relayed by TSN and ArmyInform); the post carries a route graphic, credited to him by TSN — the only published track for any strike in this file. No dive angle, final altitude, heading or terminal duration has been published. A Russian post asserts the drone came in “from the facade” (rusengineer/10488, a reposted Oleg Tsaryov text); that is an unsupported Russian claim and not used here. Zelensky and the SBU said the drone was deliberately directed at the head’s office; several Russian channels instead alleged the strike was staged by Ukrainians — no evidence was offered and nothing supports it. Steering: Flash’s personal opinion (serhii_flash/7733) is that the drone was flown online through a mesh radio relay with internet access, switched on briefly by an agent within about 5 km, “half the size of a school backpack”, because no other Shahed was airborne to relay — so a chain back to Russia was impossible. He repeated on 3 October that at the moment of the strike there were no relay Shaheds in the sky (serhii_flash/7786). This is a hypothesis; no device was found. Link choice: local-relay-kyiv-internet is Flash’s explicit explanation. mesh-to-tower-outside-kyiv is kept as the geometric alternative: a drone cruising above 7 km has radio line of sight to a mast hundreds of km away (relays.md horizon table), so only the low final descent into the city centre — whose height profile is unpublished — would constrain where a ground node must be. No LTE path is listed: Flash wrote that Kyiv wreckage shows no LTE or other “secret” links (serhii_flash/7786). Not excluded by the evidence: an autonomous optical end-game (HUR reports the Susanin optical correlation unit on the updated Geran-4 in October, after this strike), which would need no link. Re-enactment: weak geometry. Known: origin direction (Donetsk, i.e. roughly from the south-east), cruise above 7 km, target window. Unknown: descent point, dive angle, final heading.

    1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 sources

  • Claimed strike on a helicopter at Zhuliany airport, filmed from the drone

    strike Claimed
    Date
    2026-09-04
    Place
    Kyiv, Zhuliany airport (Solomianskyi district)
    Target
    A UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, according to Russian channels (said to belong to Ukraine's HUR); not confirmed by any Ukrainian source found
    Drone
    Geran-4 (claimed)
    Approach
    unpublished
    The evidence in full
    Every element of this case is a Russian claim: the target, the Geran-4 ‘Seeker’ type, the unit and the satellite confirmation. No Ukrainian statement on a helicopter loss at Zhuliany was found. It is kept because it is one of the few Kyiv strikes for which the attacker published a sequence it presents as reconnaissance followed by the strike from the air, which bears on what the camera and link can do. Rybar’s summary of the 50th brigade’s 20 August – 10 September campaign around Kyiv says this hit and a claimed MiG-29 hit at Vasylkiv on 9 September were both “confirmed by objective-control footage” (rybar/83094) — the brigade’s own footage, so not independent. Link choice: airborne-mesh-to-belarus only, because the footage is presented as aerial reconnaissance and strike video from drones over the city, which needs an airborne video path; the onward leg to the operator is not documented in any source, and the Belarus endpoint is the R2 chain’s assumption, not evidence from this strike. No approach data at all. Not a re-enactment candidate.

    1, 2, 3, 4, 5 sources

  • Claimed strike on a warehouse in Hostomel, with a day and a black-and-white onboard view

    strike Claimed
    Date
    2026-09-10
    Place
    Hostomel, Kyiv region
    Target
    A logistics warehouse (Russian MoD says it stored drone components; the head of Kyiv regional administration Tymur Tkachenko called it a civilian facility)
    Drone
    not established (claimed)
    Approach
    unpublished
    • @sashakots 2026-09-12 · onboard · 1280×720 as posted, not camera native
    The evidence in full
    Kept as a camera-view reference, not as a precision case: the drone type is given only as “Geran” and every detail comes from the Russian MoD and a war correspondent’s description of its video. The value is the description of the picture itself: a wide colour view for navigation, then a close monochrome view with an aiming marker for the final seconds. That fits the camera bay described in a September RFE/RL teardown of a Geran-4 ‘Seeker’ (day, night and infrared channels, 10x optical zoom; recorded on our Geran-4 page), but the platform here is unconfirmed — strand R1 holds the camera sources. Link choice: the operator sees a marker settle on the target, which implies a live video and command path at the end. Hostomel lies outside Kyiv’s dense centre, closer to the Belarus border, so an airborne chain or a ground mast outside the city are both consistent; nothing in the sources identifies either. No approach geometry. Not a re-enactment candidate.

    1 sources

  • Inkom business centre, filmed by a second jet drone circling at almost 3 km

    strike Confirmed
    Date
    2026-09-25
    Place
    Kyiv, Solomianskyi district — Shuliavka, near the junction of Beresteiskyi Avenue and Brodskykh Family Street
    Target
    Inkom office building; Russian channels say a Datagroup data centre was inside (Datagroup confirmed a Kyiv data centre was damaged but has not given its address)
    Drone
    Geran-5 (claimed)
    Approach
    unpublished
    Observer
    a second drone orbiting at about 3000 m (source). The simulator can show its view.
    The evidence in full
    The clearest documented case of how a Kyiv strike was steered and filmed — and it involved no ground relay. Flash: the Inkom office was hit by a Geran-5 while a second jet Shahed flew into Kyiv, circled the strike site at almost 3 km, acted as the mesh relay for the Geran-5’s radio and filmed and passed on video of the attack in real time; it then flew out of the city and destroyed a McDonald’s warehouse. He ruled out satellites, FPV drones launched from a Shahed and agents (serhii_flash/7775). Russian channels also call the striking drone a Geran-5; Flash does not say how the type was identified, so the platform stays ‘claimed’. Pro-Russian bloggers present the clip as live observation from a drone of their own over the city (rusengineer/10571 says the footage was possible “thanks to our bird over Kyiv”). The Kyiv Post reports four killed and seven injured at the office building; Kyiv city authorities later gave five dead. Approach: the striking drone’s path is not published at all; the only height in the record is the observer’s ~3 km orbit. The clip shows the camera’s view from height: a near-vertical, steady, daylight picture with enough detail to count roof fixtures — the best public evidence of picture quality over Kyiv. Link choice: airborne-mesh-to-belarus, because the relay was airborne (documented by Flash). The onward path from the orbiting Shahed to the operator is not stated by Flash; the Belarus endpoint is the R2 chain’s assumption. From 3 km the observer has radio line of sight to the ground over a radius of about 230–270 km (relays.md, our arithmetic table), so a city canyon does not constrain this link. Excluded: local-relay-kyiv-internet (Flash explicitly rules out agents here). Re-enactment: the observer’s geometry (orbit at ~3 km over a known point) can be modelled; the striker’s cannot.

    1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 sources

  • National Academy of Sciences Presidium, hit at a steep angle

    strike Confirmed
    Date
    2026-09-28
    Place
    Kyiv, central (near the German embassy), Presidium building of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
    Target
    Presidium building; an analyst quoted by EUobserver believed the aim was the Academy's vice-president Volodymyr Horbulin, whose office was one floor below the impact (his assistant was killed)
    Drone
    not established (disputed)
    Approach
    unpublished
    The evidence in full
    Footage: deliberately none linked. Al Jazeera describes videos shared online that “appeared to show a fast-moving drone slamming into the building at a steep angle”, but the widely shared imagery of this strike centres on people escaping the burning building, so no clip is linked under the casualty rule. Kept as a contrast case: precise-looking, but neither the platform nor the precision is settled. The Air Force reported 165 attack drones that night, 79 of them jets (kpszsu/80852). Al Jazeera’s description of a steep final angle is the only approach detail published for any strike in this file; no number is given, so dive_angle_deg stays null. The Kyiv Independent wrote about the strike inside a Geran-5 article but calls the weapon only “the jet-black Russian munition”; about an hour later an identical munition hit a private medical clinic a few blocks away. EUobserver cites analyst Viktor Kovalenko’s belief that Horbulin was the target — an opinion. A Russian blogger suggested the intended target was a nearby Ukrtelecom building and that Ukrainian electronic warfare pushed the drone onto the Academy (bomber_fighter/26666) — an unsupported Russian claim, recorded only because it shows the precision itself is contested. Casualties: the Kyiv Independent reports two killed, EUobserver one killed and six injured. Link choice: none. No source names the drone type, a relay, an observer drone or released onboard footage for this strike, so the evidence does not point to any chain. A steep final dive is equally consistent with an autonomous end-game. Not a re-enactment candidate (angle described only in words).

    1, 2, 3, 4, 5 sources

  • Repeated hits on the South (Pivdennyi) Bridge pylon support and stays

    strike Confirmed
    Date
    2026-10-01/2026-10-02
    Place
    Kyiv, South (Pivdennyi) Bridge over the Dnipro — cable-stayed road and metro bridge, built 1983
    Target
    The pylon support and, per Russian channels, the steel stay cables; Kyiv's mayor reported damage to a support, the roadway, a crash barrier and the metro fencing
    Drone
    Geran-4 (disputed)
    Approach
    unpublished
    The evidence in full
    What is established: the South Bridge was hit at least five times in about 36 hours on 1–2 October (Ukrainska Pravda), first with two impacts near the support on the morning of 1 October (Klitschko), then again on 1 October, during the night of 1–2 October and on 2 October. Transport over the bridge, including the metro, was suspended. Platform: not officially stated for these strikes. Ukrainian local channels said Geran-5; Russian channels variously say Geran-4 ‘Seeker’ (milinfolive/180648) and Geran-2 (rybar/83630, dva_majors/99862). The best-sourced link is indirect: Flash reported that on 30 September Russia used, for the first time on a jet drone, a cumulative-cutting warhead (KRSN, 40 kg main charge plus four modules) made for pylons and steel bridge structures (serhii_flash/7778), and on 5 October HUR tied the KRSN to the updated Geran-4. Platform recorded as geran-4, attribution disputed. Do not attribute these strikes to the Geran-5. Approach: no direction, angle, altitude or speed has been published. The Ukrainian approach clip (tsaplienko/99824) is the material from which a heading and dive angle could be measured by geolocating the camera; that has not been done publicly. Steering: Flash wrote on 3 October that “without stable online control right up to the moment of impact, it is impossible to hit a bridge support or stay precisely”, and that he had analysed the bridge strikes and whether long-range mesh channels back to Russia were possible at those moments; he concluded that 1–3 mesh relays are being switched on inside Kyiv (serhii_flash/7786). A Russian blogger likewise reads the strikes as Geran ‘Seekers’ flown “like a big FPV drone” (rusengineer/10598) — a claim. A General Staff expert, Maj. Artem Bilyk, spoke of UAVs “in a guided configuration through mesh modems” (Kyiv Post analysis). Link choice: local-relay-kyiv-internet is Flash’s stated conclusion for the bridge strikes. airborne-mesh-to-belarus is kept because the Varyag clip is described as filmed by a Varyag drone, which fits an observer/relay drone as at Inkom. Inference, not evidence: a bridge is a low target over open water; if the run-in followed the river, elevated points on either bank would have an unbroken view of it, but the approach direction is unpublished. Excluded: lte-modem-onboard (Flash: no LTE in wreckage), starlink, analog-fpv. Re-enactment: good target geometry (known structure, known impact points on support and stays, repeated hits), approach unknown — a candidate only if the Ukrainian approach clip is geolocated.

    1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 sources

  • North (Pivnichnyi) Bridge: deck on 3 October, pylon support on 4 October

    strike Confirmed
    Date
    2026-10-03/2026-10-04
    Place
    Kyiv, North (Pivnichnyi, formerly Moskovskyi) Bridge over the Dnipro — cable-stayed
    Target
    3 Oct: road deck and trolleybus overhead line; 4 Oct: road deck (Kyiv city) — Russian captions say the stay-cable support
    Drone
    Geran-4 (claimed)
    Approach
    unpublished
    The evidence in full
    Established: a jet drone hit the North Bridge on the morning of 3 October (Klitschko), damaging the road deck and the trolleybus line; two people were hurt (Kyiv Post, Kyiv city). Another strike followed on 4 October and damaged the road surface (Klitschko, TSN); Kyiv city repaired the section. The Russian MoD claimed the strike, saying it targeted a military transport route. Platform: UNIAN, a Ukrainian outlet, and Russian channels name the Geran-4; one Russian channel adds the Geran-5. No official Ukrainian identification found. After the strikes light anti-drone nets were hung on the bridge, which Russian channels doubt will stop heavy jet drones. Approach: nothing published — no direction, angle, altitude, speed or duration. Link choice: as for the South Bridge (Flash’s 3 October relay conclusion covers the Kyiv bridge strikes; Varyag released footage from its own drones). Same inference about the open river corridor, same exclusions. Re-enactment: as for the South Bridge — known target and impact points, unknown approach; the UNIAN and TSN clips are the material that could be geolocated.

    1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 sources

  • Earlier comparison: the Cabinet of Ministers building set on fire

    strike Confirmed
    Date
    2025-09-07
    Place
    Kyiv, Pecherskyi district, Government building (Cabinet of Ministers), Hrushevskoho Street
    Target
    Government building — roof and upper floors
    Drone
    not established (disputed)
    Approach
    unpublished
    The evidence in full
    Included as the earlier comparison the brief asked for, and to show how thin the evidence is. During an overnight attack of about 805 drones and decoys, the government building caught fire for the first time in the war; Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko said the roof and upper floors were damaged and an 800 m² fire was put out. Kyiv’s mayor attributed the fire to a likely downed drone (debris), while Ukrainska Pravda’s government sources insisted it was a direct strike; RFE/RL reported it as hit by drones. No drone type, approach or footage of the run-in was found — only photos of the fire and the aftermath (State Emergency Service, Svyrydenko). It predates the jet Gerans’ campaign over Kyiv. Link choice: none; nothing in the evidence shows steering. Not a re-enactment candidate.

    1, 2, 3 sources

Real footage

Links only: nothing is embedded or re-hosted, and each opens at its source. Russian channels' captions are claims. A size is that of the file as posted, after any re-encoding, never the camera's own resolution.

What the evidence shows

No remote link lets anyone fly the last second by hand. Every remote chain we can build from published figures delivers a picture that is about a quarter of a second old (256–267 ms typical), and a full see–react–correct cycle takes about half a second. Measured studies put the point where remote steering starts to degrade at 200–300 ms (Chen et al. 2025). At 600 km/h, half a second is about 90 m of flight. An operator can set the line from several kilometres out; the final dive has to be held by the drone itself.

Bandwidth, not delay, separates the scenarios. A relay on the ground in Kyiv with an internet connection can carry 720p to 1440p. A chain of drones relaying back to a mast near the Belarusian border, about 110 km away, gets roughly 0.5 Mbit/s on the radio maker’s own figures, around the 480p minimum of common streaming guidance (YouTube): enough to confirm a hit or follow a large target, not a sharp picture of a window or a bridge support.

Cameras on the drone itself are only partly documented. HUR’s Geran-5 component list shows no camera at all. Gerans of other types carry Chinese security cameras, gimbals with zoom and thermal channels, and in the MS series an infrared camera feeding an onboard computer. Russian onboard clips posted online are 848×480 to 1920×1080 as posted, which says what was published, not what the link carried.

What it means for relays

Three conclusions follow for the relay question.

  1. Precision in the final second comes from the drone, not the operator. With half a second of delay on every remote link, the accuracy reported in Kyiv points to onboard lock-on or optical guidance doing the last part, which fits what HUR and Serhii Beskrestnov report about the Seeker and Susanin systems (see Russian edge AI). The operator’s job is to choose and lock the target.
  2. Choosing a target from kilometres away needs a sharp picture, and a sharp picture needs a short radio path. That favours a node close to the city: a relay drone overhead, as in the Inkom strike, where Beskrestnov says a second jet drone circled at about 3 km and streamed the picture (Telegram), or a ground relay with an internet connection, as he argues for the SBU strike (Telegram). A mesh chain back to Belarus alone would leave the operator with a low-resolution view.
  3. Onboard LTE and onboard satellite terminals fail on speed and policy, not delay. Jet speeds are above LTE’s design envelope, and Starlink reportedly drops above about 161 km/h in Ukraine (Militarnyi), while only registered terminals have worked there since February 2026.

For the search, this narrows the useful question from “is there a relay?” to “where does the high-bandwidth hop end?” A relay drone overhead or a node inside or near the city is where that hop has to land.

Open questions

  • What camera, if any, the Geran-5 carries: HUR’s list shows none.
  • The approach geometry of any Kyiv strike: dive angle, final altitude and the length of the terminal phase are unpublished.
  • The XK-F358’s throughput at long range: the maker publishes no rate-versus-signal table.
  • Whether the relay drone in the Inkom strike passed its picture to a ground node in Kyiv or onward through other drones.
  • Measured latency from Minsk or the Belarusian border to Russia; the page uses Kyiv–Moscow as a stand-in.

Method

A chain's delay is the sum of its segments. Its picture is the largest resolution, then the highest frame rate down to 10 fps, whose bitrate fits the chain; bitrate per pixel comes from the published encoder table below, interpolated between its rows. Distance flown is speed × delay.

  • Steerable: the picture is at most 200 ms old, at least 480 lines and 15 fps.
  • Marginal: at most 1000 ms old, at least 480 lines and 10 fps. A person can follow, but not correct in time.
  • Post-strike proof only: anything less. The video still shows the hit, afterwards.
ThresholdValueFrom
Steerable delay200 ms (glass to glass)Delay at which steering performance degrades significantly [1][2]
Move-and-wait delay1000 msOur assumption, until a published figure replaces it
Frame rate15 sufficient, 10 acceptableFrame rate for task performance [1]
Bitrate per resolution480p30: 0.4 (H.264) / 0.3 (H.265) Mbit/s; 720p30: 3 (H.264) / 2 (H.265) Mbit/s; 1080p30: 5 (H.264) / 4 (H.265) Mbit/sLive-stream encoder bitrate, minimum – recommended (H.264 | H.265) [1]
Johnson criteria (detect / recognise / identify)1 / 4 / 6.4 line pairsResolution across a target's critical dimension for 50% probability of detection / recognition / identification [1][2]

The simulator's approach profiles

Speed is the highest the drone's own page cites (450 km/h when the drone is not established). The rest are assumptions, chosen to span a plausible range:

  • Steep dive 45° from 500 m, last 6 s. Assumption. The only approach description published for any strike here is Al Jazeera's "a fast-moving drone slamming into the building at a steep angle" (Academy of Sciences, 28 Sep 2026); no angle was given. source
  • Shallow run-in 12° from 150 m, last 8 s. Assumption: a low final run that pitches gently down onto a facade. Several strikes here hit facades (Inkom: "a flash at the facade" in the posted clip's description).
  • Low run along a street 3° from 40 m, last 8 s. Assumption: a run below rooftop height for the last kilometre, the hardest case for a link that needs line of sight to a relay.
Every published requirement on the page (14)
  • Delay at which operators first perceive it (mobile-robot teleoperation): 100-200 ms

    Measured user study (Chen, Wang, Liu, Liu, Xi, 2025): 'a threshold window (100-200 ms) for early perception of delay in humans'. Ground robot, not aircraft.

    source 1

  • Delay at which steering performance degrades significantly: 200-300 ms

    Same study: 'significant performance degradation at 200-300 ms delays'; 'When delay exceeds 400 ms, all features plateau' (operators have already switched strategy). A 2026 simulation of camera-based closed-loop driving (180 runs) found 'a sharp collapse in stability between 150 ms and 225 ms of one-way perception latency', route completion falling from 100% to below 50% (Khalil & Kwon) — simulation, not a human trial.

    source 1, source 2

  • Effect of 225 ms display lag on aiming at a target: +64% movement time, +214% errors vs zero lag relative

    MacKenzie & Ware, INTERCHI '93, Fitts' law target-acquisition experiment; lag acts multiplicatively on task difficulty (model explains 94% of variance). Desktop pointing, not flight; it shows that lag hurts most on small, hard targets.

    source 1

  • Typical glass-to-glass delay of remote robot video over WebRTC: 150-180 ms

    Engineering analysis on the Open Robotics forum (chfritz, 6 May 2026): capture incl. USB ~100 ms, H.264 encode and decode ~10 ms or less each, WebRTC jitter buffer ~10 ms; total 150-180 ms 'typical'. Practitioner measurement, not peer reviewed.

    source 1

  • Simple visual reaction time: 208-224 ms

    Mean simple visual reaction time of 100 students to four light colours: 207.88 (red) to 224.39 ms (blue) (Amini Vishteh et al., Clinical Optometry 2019). A simple reaction to a light is a lower bound: choosing and making a steering correction takes longer. Not specific to drone operators.

    source 1

  • Frame rate for task performance: 10 acceptable, 15 sufficient frames/s

    Chen & Thropp, 'Review of low frame rate effects on human performance', IEEE Trans. SMC-A 37(6) 2007, as summarised by Liu, Claypool et al. (CHI 2023): '10 f/s is acceptable and 15 f/s is sufficient for performance'. Original not fetched (paywalled); secondary summary. Frame period also adds capture delay: 1000/fps ms (40 ms at 25 fps, our arithmetic).

    source 1

  • Resolution across a target's critical dimension for 50% probability of detection / recognition / identification: 1.0 ± 0.25 / 4 ± 0.8 / 6.4 ± 1.5 line pairs (1 line pair = 2 pixels) line pairs

    Johnson (1958). 'These amounts of resolution give a 50 percent probability'. Later NVESD models use the geometric mean of height and width rather than the minimum dimension, so figures depend on convention.

    source 1, source 2

  • Pixels per metre at the target for Detection / Observation / Recognition / Identification (people, visible-light CCTV): 25 / 62 / 125 / 250 px/m

    IEC EN 62676-4:2015 DORI levels as published by a camera vendor (TP-Link/Omada); standard text itself not fetched (paywalled). Built for identifying people, so it overstates what is needed to aim at a building.

    source 1

  • Range at which a 20 m-wide object meets Johnson thresholds, 1920-pixel-wide camera with 90° horizontal field of view: identify ~1.5 km, recognise ~2.4 km, detect ~9.6 km km

    Our arithmetic. Pixels per metre = 1920 / (2·d·tan 45°) = 960/d (d in m). A 20 m object needs 12.8 px to identify (6.4 lp × 2), 8 px to recognise, 2 px to detect: d = 960·20/px. Ignores compression, motion blur and haze, all of which reduce effective resolution. The 20 m object and 90° lens are illustrative, not a documented Geran camera (see cameras.yaml, strand R1).

    source 1

  • Live-stream encoder bitrate, minimum – recommended (H.264 | H.265): 480p30: 0.4-4 | 0.3-3; 720p30/60: 3-8 | 2-6; 1080p30: 5-14 | 4-10; 1080p60: 6-17 | 4-12 Mbit/s

    YouTube Live encoder settings. Quality targets for viewers; a steering link can run nearer the minimum column. Fast camera motion is the hardest case for an encoder (every frame differs), so at a fixed bitrate the picture degrades as the target grows.

    source 1

  • 3GPP drone-on-LTE requirements: command & control vs payload: C2: 60-100 kbit/s each way, 50 ms one way, PER ≤ 1e-3; payload (video): up to 50 Mbit/s uplink mixed

    3GPP TR 36.777 table 5.1-1. Steering commands are tiny; video is what fills a link. The same study assumed aircraft up to 300 m and 160 km/h (§4.1).

    source 1, source 2

  • Published end-to-end latency of purpose-built FPV video links: DJI O3: as low as 30 ms (1080p/100fps), 40 ms (1080p/60fps), <28 ms (810p/120fps); OpenIPC: 26-67 ms (dedicated ground station), 45-65 ms (goggles), 50-100 ms (phone), 60-100 ms (laptop); Walksnail Avatar: 22 ms average ms

    DJI: tested outdoors without interference, max 50 Mbit/s, range 10 km (FCC) / 2 km (CE). OpenIPC page: 'Reported in the OpenIPC and wfb-ng chats, not measured by us'; 'frame rate and screen refresh decide it'; changing only the monitor shifted latency by 120 ms. Walksnail figure from retailer listings of the vendor claim.

    source 1, source 2, source 3

  • Frame latency, analog NTSC vs HDZero digital: analog ~18.7 ms; HDZero 60 fps ~19.6 ms; HDZero 90 fps ~14.1 ms (pixel latency ~2-3 ms) ms

    Divimath (HDZero maker) white paper; derived as pixel latency + one frame period, not bench-measured.

    source 1

  • Distance flown during one control loop: 100 ms: 12.5-19.4 m; 250 ms: 31-49 m; 500 ms: 63-97 m; 750 ms: 94-146 m (450-700 km/h) m

    Our arithmetic: distance = speed (km/h) / 3.6 × loop (s). 450 km/h = 125 m/s, 600 km/h = 166.7 m/s, 700 km/h = 194.4 m/s. Speeds as on relays.md (Geran-5 quoted cruise).

    source 1

Sources

  1. Teleoperation latency user study — arXiv (Chen et al.) 2025
  2. Live encoder settings, bitrates and resolutions — YouTube Help
  3. Telegram channel:Relay jet drone over the Inkom strike — Serhii Beskrestnov (Telegram) 2026-09-27
  4. Telegram channel:On the SBU headquarters strike — Serhii Beskrestnov (Telegram) 2026-09-05
  5. Starlink restricts interception of jet drones — Militarnyi 2026-10-17
  6. XK-F358 MIMO mesh radio — Shenzhen Xingkai Technology