Relays over Kyiv: what is known about the radio nodes said to guide Russian drones
Are hidden radio relays inside Kyiv steering Geran drones onto their targets? The claims, who made them, the technology they would need, and how each one connects to parts recovered from the Geran-5.
Status as of
In autumn 2026 Russian jet drones began hitting small, exact targets in Kyiv: a business centre, the security service’s headquarters, the supports of a bridge. A Geran-5 flies too far from Russia for an operator to see its target by direct radio. So how is it steered in the last seconds? One explanation, put forward most strongly by Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, a radio specialist and adviser to Ukraine’s defence minister, is that small mesh radio relays are switched on inside the city. This page sets out what is established, what is claimed, and what the recovered parts say.
The short answer
- Established: the Geran-5 carries a Chinese mesh radio and a mobile-network tracker (parts list). Russia relays control and video through other drones in the air, and through ground masts in Belarus and occupied Ukraine, which Ukraine has struck.
- Claimed, not proven: one to three hidden mesh relays inside Kyiv. Flash calls this his technical conclusion, not a confirmed fact. Ukraine’s head of electronic warfare has said such relays are possible.
- Not found: no relay of this kind has been publicly shown seized inside a Ukrainian city.
Who claims what
| Date | Who | What they said | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11 Sep 2025 | Defense Express, from wreckage | Shaheds now carry the XK-F358 mesh modem and a nose camera as standard. Two possible ways to reach the operator: an airborne chain of drones, or “pre-positioned ground-based relay stations, possibly installed through Russia’s agent network”. | Hardware documented; ground relays a possibility |
| 17 Nov 2025 | SBU, via Militarnyi | A woman from Konotop, said to work for Russian military intelligence, bought radio equipment, tuned it to frequencies Russia needed, and installed “repeaters” on the roofs of abandoned buildings in Sumy region to keep drones and missiles connected. | Official case; outside Kyiv; device model not given |
| 4 Sep 2026 | Flash, via Ukrainska Pravda | On the strike on the SBU headquarters: in his “personal opinion” a mesh relay with internet access, “about half the size of a school backpack”, was switched on within about 5 km for a short time, because no other drone was in the air to relay. | Opinion |
| 27 Sep 2026 | Flash | On the Geran-5 strike on the Inkom business centre: a jet Shahed circling at almost 3 km relayed the Geran-5’s radio signals and filmed the hit. “No secret satellites, no FPV from a Shahed, no Russian agents.” | Airborne relay; his own explanation |
| 3 Oct 2026 | Flash, via Kyiv Post | “I now insist that enemy mesh radio relays are being switched on in Kyiv”, “maybe one to three”. As long as they exist, jamming over the city will not work. Wreckage shows “no LTE”. “Let me be wrong about the relays.” | Hypothesis, from strike precision |
| 4 Oct 2026 | Flash, via TSN | Shows what such relays look like: mesh modems of a few to several tens of watts, which “can be assembled in a private house, in a car, or in a suitcase”. | Illustration, not a seized device |
| 5 Oct 2026 | SBU | Arrest of a man who scouted defence and infrastructure targets in Kyiv for strikes on 21–24 September, including Geran-5s. One headline linked him to “repeater stations”; the SBU’s account lists two smartphones seized. | Arrest real; no relay hardware reported |
| 15 Oct 2026 | LIGA.net, with Ivan Pavlenko, head of electronic warfare at the General Staff | “In Kyiv, it is possible to install repeaters — devices that help Russian drones lock onto targets.” | Possibility |
| Sep–Oct 2026 | Ukrainian General Staff, via Ukranews | Strikes on a “mesh-network repeater” in the Black Sea area and on a relay in Bryansk region. | Ground relays outside Ukrainian-held territory, confirmed |
Russian channels mostly mock the claim or use it to argue that the SBU strike was staged; none confirms relays inside Kyiv (Russian Engineer).
The technology, part by part
Mesh radio — the Xingkay XK-F358
The one part every version of the claim depends on. HUR found an XK-F358 mesh modem in the first Geran-5, and the same family in the Geran-2, Gerbera and Geran-4. A mesh radio passes data from node to node: each drone, or any other unit on the same network, can forward another’s control and video. The maker, Shenzhen Xingkai Technology, lists it with (product page):
- 2 × 10 W output, COFDM with two antennas, channels of 1.25 to 20 MHz, 1 to 100 Mbit/s;
- frequency modules from 225 MHz to 6 GHz; the band used on Gerans has not been published. Flash says the related modems on Molniya and Gerbera drones use 1,300–1,500 MHz, so the L band is likely, not established;
- about 7 ms delay per hop, more than 15 hops for data and 8 for video, up to 256 nodes with no central station;
- links described as “air-to-air, air-to-ground and ground-to-ground”, range “100–300 km line of sight, 1–30 km in cities”;
- AES encryption and automatic frequency hopping;
- optional 4G and internet routing;
- 12.7 × 11 × 3.3 cm, 635 g, powered at 18–36 V.
Nothing in that listing stops a ground unit from joining a drone’s network, and the optional internet routing is exactly what Flash’s “relay with internet access” would need: an operator in Russia, a connection over the internet to a box in Kyiv, and a radio hop from the box to the drone. The Insider, relayed by the Kyiv Post, reported that Xingkai invoiced Alabuga for 500 modems. The modem is on no US, EU, UK or Ukrainian sanctions list.
Mobile networks — the Borscht tracker and its antennas
The second link the Geran-5 carries is a tracker built on a Raspberry Pi with two USB 3G/LTE modems, fed by antennas laminated into its skin. In 2025 Flash said such trackers only reported position, speed and height. A relay on the ground could use this path only if the modem’s SIM card works on a Ukrainian network; Ukraine blocks roaming, and Flash wrote that the Kyiv wreckage showed “no LTE”.
Satellite navigation — the Kometa-M12
The Kometa-M12 is built to ignore interference, with a 12-element antenna that turns its blind spots towards a jammer. No one has claimed satellite-signal repeaters inside Ukrainian cities. Flash’s point is the reverse: jamming satellite navigation does not help if an operator is flying the drone by hand over a mesh link.
Optical navigation — Susanin
The Geran-5 K5 is reported to carry Susanin, a camera system that matches the ground below against stored images. A drone that can find its target this way needs no relay at all for the last part of its flight, which is one reason precise strikes alone do not prove that relays exist.
Agents on the ground
The SBU has caught agents placing GPS trackers on fuel trucks and near a power plant, and pointing mobile-connected cameras at air defence. These feed coordinates and damage reports to planners; none talks to a part in the drone.
Is it plausible?
Our assessment from the published figures:
- Geometry is not the obstacle. Radio line of sight from a rooftop 30 m up reaches a drone at 500 m altitude more than 100 km away, and one at 3 km about 250 km away. A box in Kyiv could easily reach a drone over the city.
- Size and power fit the description. A 635 g modem drawing 50–250 W runs from a car battery or a suitcase pack.
- It is easy to find while it transmits. A 20 W radio in a city is a strong emitter for direction-finding crews, which is why the claim has relays switched on only briefly.
- There are simpler explanations. A relay drone overhead is documented (the Inkom strike), and optical navigation can explain precise hits without any link.
- No hardware has been shown. Until a relay is found in a Ukrainian city, the claim remains a hypothesis that some officials take seriously.
Countermeasures reported
- Electronic-warfare makers are testing jammers against mesh-controlled drones with Brave1 and the General Staff (Euromaidan Press).
- Shooting down the relay drone first: when a Gerbera relay falls, the Molniya drones behind it lose their link (Flash).
- Strikes on ground relays in Russian-held areas and Belarus’ border region (General Staff).
- Roaming blocked inside Ukraine, cutting foreign SIM cards off the mobile network.
- Calls from Flash to search Kyiv for relays.
Open questions
- Which frequency module the Geran XK-F358 units carry.
- Whether the SBU seized any radio equipment in the Kyiv case of 5 October.
- What Ukraine’s General Staff has found, if anything, in direction-finding over Kyiv.