Cascade Systems
Builds the Lima GNSS jamming and spoofing system used to push Russian drones, glide bombs and cruise missiles off course.

Cascade Systems is a Kyiv-based Ukrainian electronic-warfare firm whose Lima station has become one of the more visible pieces of the country’s layered defence against Russian precision strikes. The company builds ground-based GNSS jamming and spoofing equipment aimed at the satellite-navigation receivers that Russian Shahed/Geran-series drones, glide bombs and cruise and ballistic missiles rely on to find their targets.
Lima works across the frequencies used by GPS and GLONASS. In jamming mode it drowns out the real satellite signal with noise within a radius around the station; in spoofing mode it transmits a counterfeit signal that convinces the munition’s receiver it is somewhere other than where it actually is, nudging the weapon off course or into open ground. The company presents Lima as a distributed asset, meant to be fielded in overlapping clusters rather than as a single site, so that an incoming munition can be handed between stations as it crosses the protected area. That architecture matters particularly for cruise missiles and Shahed swarms, which can be routed around any one jammer if the coverage is thin.
In early 2025 Cascade introduced Lima Quant, an upgraded variant reported to extend the system’s reach and widen the set of satellite bands it covers. The upgrade followed a year in which Russian engineers worked to harden Shahed guidance against electronic warfare — adding Kometa controlled-reception-pattern antennas, inertial back-ups and, in some recovered airframes, GSM-based telemetry — forcing Ukrainian jammer-makers to iterate at a similar pace.
Lima has become one of the standard tools of the volunteer-led Night Watch air-defence network, which pairs mobile intercept groups with civilian-crowdfunded jamming and spotting stations in a layer beneath Ukraine’s conventional surface-to-air systems. Ukrainian coverage of the campaign to protect frontline cities and infrastructure from glide-bomb attacks has repeatedly cited GNSS deception as the main viable counter in the window before each weapon’s terminal flight — a few hundred metres of deflection the difference between a hit on a hospital and a landing in a field.
Cascade sits inside a cluster of Ukrainian EW specialists that has grown up around the war — Kvertus with its Ai-Petri and anti-drone domes, Piranha Tech on tactical jammers at the brigade level, and the trench-level Himera radios on the communications side — each a different answer to the same problem of a battlefield saturated with cheap, GPS-dependent robots. The company’s trajectory tracks the broader shape of Ukraine’s wartime defence industry: founded quietly, scaled through combat feedback, and valued by foreign observers less for the hardware itself than for the hard-won doctrine of how to use it.
Products
Hardware
Lima
Ground-based GNSS jamming and spoofing station that suppresses or substitutes satellite-navigation signals to misdirect Shahed/Geran drones, glide bombs and cruise and ballistic missiles.
Lima Quant
Upgraded Lima variant introduced in early 2025.
Sources
- www.pravda.com.ua/eng/ (2026-06-19) — Ukrainska Pravda — Lima origin, operator unit, suppression statistics.
- kyivindependent.com/ (2026-06-19) — Kyiv Independent — Night Watch unit, method, station cost.
- euromaidanpress.com/ (2026-06-19) — Euromaidan Press — unit counts, pricing, Lima Quant.
- www.kyivpost.com/post/76818 (2026-06-19) — Kyiv Post (via Politico) — reported US registration, GNSS method.
- limaew.com/ (2026-06-19) — Lima official product site.